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INTRODUCTION
At the end of the Cold War, President Bush proclaimed a "New world order "I Consrdermg this new order, many nations, too include the United States, thought the Uruted Nation's (UN) could play a larger role in solving world calamities and anarclnc condrtions Thrs was especially true for UN peace-keepmg operations Whrle on the campargn trarl, candidate Brll Clinton joined the chorus calling for a greater UN role m the post cold war era He suggested establishing a UN "rapid deployment force"2 that would stand guard "at the border of countries threatened by aggression preventing mass vrolence against civrlian populations and combating terrorism."3 His words produced images of a force similar to that m the above New York Times quote As one of the first acts of his admmistration, President Clinton set out to draft a United States (U S ) peace-keeping policy in that view However, after fourteen months of arduous, interagency rewrrting and leaking to the press, the Clinton administration had failed to produce a U S peace-keeping pohcy consistent with this view. 1 t had also developed a greater skepticism about the UN's abiity to effectively address peace-keeping missions all together The Clmton administratton's change of view was drrven by popular disagreement with one of the pohcy's key features --the placement of U S forces under foreign command durmg UN peacekeeping operations The Clinton administration's policy reform became a victim of partisan and bureaucratic politics Policy makers failed to foresee how domestrc opinion towards their policy to place U S. forces under foreign command would decrease amidst growing American casualties m current peacekeeping operations How did the admmistration's effort to craft a peace-keeping policy become overshadowed by the issue of putting U S forces under foreign command? What precipitated the change in the administration views and caused rt to replace the foreign command issue with a concept called "operational control?"4 This paper describes the process and bureaucratic context m which thrs policy was developed PRELUDE TO CHANGE Several factors set the conditrons for President Clmton to change the U S peace-keeping policy Growing world sentiment for a greater UN role was first among these A Spring 1991
Foreign Affarrs' article captured that pretiectron "The use of mrlitary force by the UN for enforcement and peacekeepmg purposes is essential to the new world order envisioned by presidents Bush and Gorbachev Both leaders foresee a world order founded on collective securrty The Persian Gulf War provided a model of how the UN could be mvolved in mamtaining mternational security Alternative procedures nnght allow national forces to be brought together under a unified UN command, or they might have each member country maintain units in its armed forces that are earmarked for UN services Such procedures are not without their problems, but the opportunity to achieve a new level of collective security should not be missed "5
Secondly, conditions were set by the fact that the UN's participation in peace-keeping operations had risen sigmficantly durmg the periods prior to the end of the Cold War and Just The NCS staff drafkmg group developed and published a peacekeepmg policy that did not consrder current peacekeeping events and the domestic response to them The UN's terrible performance m Somalia widely mfluenced public and Congressional opinion and actions
Faced by bureaucratic critiasm to putting U S troops under forergn command, President
Clinton subscribed to a policy that makes a tenuous semantrc distmction between "command" and "operational control " This type of distinction confounds the more technical and appropriate definitions in Joint, operational and tactical manuals Its potential for adding "fiictron" to future peace-keeping operations is very hrgh Bottom-line, the Clinton administration attempted to reform U S peacekeepmg policy so that it would be consistent with the post Cold War realities at home and abroad However, as the UN's efforts at peacekeeping came under fire, both literally and figuratrvely, so did the administration's policy for putting U S forces under foreign command
